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John Kampfner on tactical voting against Tony
Monday 1st November 2004
Downing Street strategists fear that voters may be so eager to get
Tony Blair out of No 10 that, for the first time, Lib Dem-inclined
people will vote for the Tories.
By John
Kampfner
.
With six months to go before the likely date of the general election
- 05/05/05 - Labour strategists are beginning to suspect that the ploy
that served them so well could now be their undoing. Tactical voting
provided the party with results in the last two elections out of proportion
to its real popularity. It is often forgotten that the turnout in 1997
was the lowest since 1935. Four years later, the Labour vote dropped
to 10.7 million, the third-lowest vote since the Second World War and
only marginally above the election of 1987, when Margaret Thatcher
had her third resounding victory. Still, both 1997 and 2001 have gone
down in history as landslides.
Now one of the causes of those victories may have disappeared - the desperation
of many people to do whatever it took to see off the Conservatives. Instead,
there are already signs that tactical voting is being used specifically
against Tony Blair. One example was the Hartlepool by-election, where the
already small Tory vote was shared between the UK Independence Party and
the Liberal Democrats. With Ukip involved in fratricide over its leadership,
its threat to the Tories may be waning. There is, however, increasing evidence
that Conservative voters, especially those opposed to the war, are comfortable
opting for the Liberal Democrats in seats where they pose the only serious
challenge to Labour. More damaging for Labour is any suggestion that tactical
voting might take place in reverse - Lib Dem-inclined people biting their
lips and backing the Tory if he or she has a chance of winning. That would
be a huge step. To make it, they would have to justify it in one of three
ways - that their top priority was to remove Blair; that the Tory candidate
was not in favour of the war; or that the Tories had no chance of actually
returning to power. Liberal-to-Tory tactical voting still falls far short
of being a trend, but it is being discussed.
Michael Howard's change of tack on Iraq, first signalled in his NS interview
(4 October) when he accused the Prime Minister of lying, was based on the
assumption that the election will be used as a plebiscite on Blair's trustworthiness.
The Conservative leader's calculation is as follows: he is prepared to
take hits on his volte-face on the war. He is prepared to stand accused
of opportunism, inconsistency and incoherence, because evidence is increasing
of a direct correlation between the public's attitudes towards Iraq and
Blair's fortunes. The percentage of voters who believe the war was right
is now virtually identical to the percentage who intend to vote Labour
- roughly a third.
Privately, Labour MPs testify to the problem. Several, including loyalists,
talk of their difficulty in convincing voters at the doorstep that Blair
is to be trusted. They say it is only once they get over that hurdle that
they can start making the comparative case between the two parties. Blair,
they say, now looks like a liability.
None of this makes a Howard victory remotely likely. The boundary configurations
are such that it would take a national Tory lead of between 5 and 8 percentage
points for there even to be a hung parliament. The Conservatives would
need a swing bigger than Labour's in 1997 to win an outright majority.
Against that must be set differential turnout. There is little sign of
a positive Tory vote stretching much beyond their core, but that core has
a strong likelihood of turning out. The same cannot be said of parts of
the Labour vote. Add to this the tendency for pollsters over the past two
elections to overstate Labour's support (in 2001 by between 1 and 13 percentage
points), and to underplay in particular the Lib Dems' (by up to 8 points),
and the situation remains fluid.
The upsurge in support for the Lib Dems appears solid. In the months before
the 2001 election, Charles Kennedy's party had been locked at roughly 15
per cent. Now it is consistently in the mid-to-late twenties, with the
prospect of more to come. The distribution of those votes remains the great
imponderable, but in swathes of urban Britain - seats with a high proportion
of Muslim voters - a good result is virtually guaranteed.
Labour's private polling suggests that up to a third of the voters who
backed it last time will ditch the party because of Iraq and what this
has done to the broader issue of trust. They will either not bother to
show, or vote elsewhere. If they opt for the latter, will they make their
votes count or will they merely register a protest? Will they protest in
large enough concentrations to allow in another party? Will they opt for
any alternative that would deliver a change of prime minister?
Labour's success in 2001 boiled down to initial reservations about Tony
Blair being outweighed by continued antipathy toward the Conservatives.
If reservation has turned into hostility and if antipathy has become ambivalence,
the result could be closer than many think.
This article first appeared in the New
Statesman and may not be reproduced
without permission.
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