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“The
questioning was polite, but probing”
Monday 19th July 2004
The phone call was quintessential Whitehall. Would
I, Lord Butler’s man inquired, care to clarify one or two points raised
in my book? A few days later, as I presented myself at the reception desk of
the Cabinet Office, a lady was waiting to whisk me straight in.
We had agreed
earlier that no attempt would be made to wheedle out sources, but I suggested
I might none the less be able to provide some context. Call it a vague notion
of public interest. Call it curiosity. For nearly an hour I was asked to substantiate
a number of points in Blair’s Wars, particularly the assertion that Blair “had
his doubts” about the intelligence throughout. What evidence did I have
for that, and how could I therefore account for the PM’s many public claims
that he had “no doubts” Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction?
The questioning was polite, but probing. Butler and his band of the
great and the good had prepared thoroughly for the meeting, pointing me to relevant
passages from the book with alarming speed. The session had none of the showmanship
of the Hutton inquiry last August, with its combative barristers, which had lulled
us into a false sense of expectation. Away from the public glare, Butler suggested
discreetly that it came down to whether Blair had told the truth. I suggested
that Blair did not necessarily know the intelligence to be wrong, but he willed
it to be right. At no point did he know it to be right.
This article first appeared in the New
Statesman and may not be reproduced
without permission.
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